

Politiques et expériences de l'Australie

Économie et Développement Durable: Une Alliance Réaliste?
Québec

17 et 18 mai 2007

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Australia

One Sub-Catchment

Impact of landscape change on EG&S

Environmental good/service	Impact on stock (1750....2007)
Stream flow	100%....409%
Saline area (ground water < 0.8m)	5%....13%
Habitat	100%....4%

- Impact depends on: type of intervention; land management; location of intervention
- Joint supply – one change generates a bundle of environmental goods and services (EG&S)

Background

Changing approaches in Australia

- Traditional approaches to the environment
 - Inefficient and ineffective (Australian National Audit Office)


- A “mechanism design” approach
 - Diagnose cause of missing markets/institutions
 - Apply modern microeconomic ideas
 - Test and refine in the laboratory or field

- A national program to build capability
 - Market-based Instruments Pilot Program

- Victoria going for full implementation
 - EG&S from private land
 - \$14m program

The National Program

MBI Pilots – Round One




The Victorian Program

Design and create the missing institutions

The public

NGOs

Profit making firms



Information from:

- Transactions (flow)
- Biophysical models (stock)



Satellite Accounts - Environment

Information from

Transactions
& surveys



National Accounts

In The Field

The role of new institutions

- Efficient supply of EG&S from private land
 - Avoid subsidies


- Resolve adverse selection
 - Which are the low-cost providers? (harness competition)
 - Science - what are the outcomes?
 - Competition - what are the costs? (landholder)

 - TEP, Auction, Offset market resolve these questions

- Minimise moral hazard
 - Are the landholders supplying contracted outcomes?

Adverse Selection (Hidden Information)

Is the site low cost or high cost?





In The Field

Hidden information - cost

Site visit – visual assessment of habitat


Model – salinity, water quality, carbon, stream flow



How much will I receive when I sell the carbon in TEP market?

What extra would I need to be paid to change land use?

What will other landholders ask for & do I have a good site?




Submit bid


Results

Everyone is different

Heterogeneous environmental impacts




Heterogeneous agents




Results

Information makes a big difference



Results

Carbon market reduces public funding




Price Carbon
Saving to public

\$0/t	\$6/t	\$12/t	\$20/t
0%	13%	26%	44%


Results

Environmental accounts

Land Account: Terrestrial habitat



Land Account: Stream flow



Results

Key observations

- Improved cost-effectiveness
 - 30% improvement over random allocation of contracts
 - 7 times over fixed-price grants (BushTender)
- Transparent
 - 37 units of habitat or 1 of dryland salinity
 - 4.5 units of water quality or 1 dryland salinity
 - 8.7 units of habitat or 1 of water quality
- Accountable
 - A property right/contract behind each investment
 - Monitored with incentive payments
- Ready engagement
 - Landholders like individual contract and bidding process
- Environmental Accounts
 - Transactions based approach (System of National Accounts)

Conclusions

The big picture

- Ideas matter
 - Diagnose, frame and design new institutions

- New institutions need to be developed
 - Mechanism design methodology
 - It's all about information and clever incentives

- Bring the environment into the economic system
 - Economic efficiency
 - Transparency
 - Governance and probity
 - National Accounts

- Broad application
 - Intellectual arbitrage